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Abstract
Using a simple two-region model where local or central regulators set capital require-
ments as risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we demonstrate the importance of
capital requirements being set centrally when cross-region spillovers are large and local
regulators suffer from substantial regulatory capture. We show that local regulators
may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the
degree of supervisory capture is relatively small, and that capital regulation at central
rather than local levels is more beneficial the larger the impact of systemic risk and the
more asymmetric is regulatory capture at the local level.
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1 Introduction
The banking industry has experienced significant global integration over the last two
decades, with banks expanding their activities beyond the authority of their local su-
pervisors. When the regulatory architecture in place does not allow for the interdepen-
dencies between countries or regions that result from this financial integration, financial
stability can be impaired. This problem is particularly relevant in Europe and in the
US. In Europe, regulation and supervision of banks used to be national responsibili-
ties; under the proposed ”Single Supervisory Mechanism”, ”significant” banks are to
be supervised directly by the European Central Bank (ECB), whereas smaller banks
would continue to be under national supervision. The U.S., on the other hand, has
historically evolved into a dual supervisory system in which each depository institu-
tion is subject to regulation by its chartering authority (state or federal) and one of
the federal primary regulators.1 When economies have multiple regulators at possibly
different levels, the question of what kind of arrangement is optimal from an overall
welfare perspective becomes crucial. Our paper aims to contribute to the theoretical
basis for this discussion.
Several theoretical papers examine issues relating to the interaction of banking regu-
lators at a ”horizontal” level. Some analyze the interplay between multinational banking
and national supervision when the latter does not internalize its impact on the welfare of
other countries (Holthausen and Rnde (2004), Calzolari and Loranth (2011), Beck et al.
(2013), Agur (2013)). Other papers focus on coordination problems between different
banking regulators, which might be in different countries or have different objectives
(Acharya (2003), Kahn and Santos (2005), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), Hardy and
Nieto (2011)). Colliard (2015), on the other hand, examines the optimal ”vertical” bank
closure arrangements when bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and cen-
tral/federal supervisors; he shows that such a system should be designed to optimally
balance the lower inspection costs of local supervisors with the ability of the central
level to internalize cross-border or interstate externalities.2
1The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation are in charge of federally chartered banks, state member banks and state non
member banks, respectively.
2Relevant empirical papers that examine differences in the behavior of bank supervisors at the
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Our paper is most closely related to Colliard (2015), in that we also focus less on
”horizontal” differences between regions/countries and regulators, and more on the im-
portant divergence between local and central regulators’ objectives and their means to
implement them. Whereas Colliard (2015) only examines optimal bank bailout arrange-
ments in a framework that abstracts from bank capital, we specifically focus on optimal
bank capital regulation with the aim to determine under what circumstances central
bank regulation and/or supervision might be preferable to local one. For this, we de-
velop a simple two-region model where local regulators are concerned about expected
costs of their banks failing and the opportunity cost of capital, but ignore interregion
spillovers associated with bank failures. A central regulator internalizes the positive
spillover effects of higher capital ratios, but faces a potentially higher cost of observing
bank types than local regulators due to its supervisory “remoteness”; it may further-
more attach less weight to banks’ opportunity cost of capital if exposed to less regulatory
capture than local regulators.
Our results demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being determined at
a central level particularly when interregion or cross-country spillovers are large and local
regulators suffer from substantial degrees of regulatory capture. We further highlight
the importance for such a central regulator to deal with the potential issues relating to
supervisory “remoteness” in this context, and show that local regulators may be inclined
to surrender regulatory power to a central regulator only when spillover effects are large
but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small. We also demonstrate that
bank capital regulation at the central rather than the local level is more beneficial the
larger the impact of systemic risk and the greater the degree of asymmetry in regulatory
capture at the local level.
The model is now developed in Section 2, our core welfare results are derived and
discussed in Section 3, Section 4 presents several extensions to our analysis, and Section
5 concludes the paper.
state/federal level in the US are Rezende (2011) and Agarwal et al. (2014); they find significant differ-
ences in their treatment of supervised banks.
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2 Model
We develop a simple model of bank regulation to examine under what circumstances
central bank regulation and/or supervision might be preferable to local one. Banks in
symmetric regions/countries3 A,B have projects that pay x > 1 with probability 1− p
and x = 0 otherwise. Expected bank profit is then Π = (1 − p) (x− (1− k)) − kq,
with cost of capital q > 1 and capital ratio 0 < k < 1. There is imperfect information
about bank type such that p can be ph = p + κ < 1 with probability 0.5 and pl =
p − κ > 0 otherwise, uncorrelated between regions. Local or central regulators, acting
as supervisors, can observe bank type at a cost in which case they can apply risk
sensitive capital ratios, otherwise they are bound to simply impose a leverage ratio.
Local regulators in regions A,B consider expected payouts to depositors (assuming
full deposit insurance) and the opportunity cost of capital, but ignore positive spillover
effects of higher capital ratios on the other region. A central regulator considers analo-
gous objectives for the two regions jointly but internalizes the positive spillover effects
of higher capital ratios between them. As a supervisor, a central regulator faces a
potentially higher cost of observing bank types than local regulators due to its super-
visory “remoteness”. As a regulator, on the other hand, it may attach less weight to
banks’ opportunity cost of capital if it is exposed to less regulatory capture than local
regulators.
The loss function faced by the central regulator is then
Λs = 2ms +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + ωskiA (q − 1) + φpjB(1− kjB)
+ pjB(1− kjB)2 + ωskjB (q − 1) + φpiA(1− kiA)) (1)
where ωs > 0 is its weight on the opportunity cost of capital, ms > 0 its cost of observing
bank types in each region, φ > 0 the impact of spillovers arising from bank failures in
the other region, and Θ = {h, l} the set of bank types. The corresponding loss function
3For simplicity we shall only refer to regions from now on.
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considered by the local regulator in region A is
ΛnA = mn +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + ωnkiA (q − 1) + φpjB(1− kjB)) (2)
where ωn > ωs is its weight on the opportunity cost of capital, and 0 < mn < ms its
cost of observing the bank type; an analogous loss function applies to the local regulator
in region B.
If the central regulator observes bank types at cost ms, it solves for optimal risk
sensitive capital requirements kshA , k
sl
A , k
sh
B , k
sl
B through
min
khA,k
l
A,k
h
B ,k
l
B
Λs (3)
Otherwise, it solves for the optimal leverage ratios ksA, k
s
B through
min
kA,kB
Λs s.t. khA = k
l
A = kA , k
h
B = k
l
B = kB , ms = 0 (4)
Similarly, if the local regulator in region A observes the bank type at cost mn, it
solves for optimal risk sensitive capital requirements knhA , k
nl
A through
min
khA,k
l
A
ΛnA (5)
Otherwise, it solves for the optimal leverage ratio knA through
min
kA
ΛnA s.t. k
h
A = k
l
A = kA , mn = 0 (6)
and analogously for the local regulator in region B.
We can summarize the resulting optimal risk sensitive capital and leverage require-
ments in
4
Lemma 1. A central regulator would set risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios
kshA = k
sh
B = 1 +
φ
2
− ωs(q − 1)
2(p+ κ)
, kslA = k
sl
B = 1 +
φ
2
− ωs(q − 1)
2(p− κ)
ksA = k
s
B = 1 +
φ
2
− ωs(q − 1)
2p
Local regulators, on the other hand, would set risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios
knhA = k
nh
B = 1−
ωn(q − 1)
2(p+ κ)
, knlA = k
nl
B = 1−
ωn(q − 1)
2(p− κ)
knA = k
n
B = 1−
ωn(q − 1)
2p
Proof. Follows from solving the minimization problems eqs. (3)-(6).
We can further state
Corollary 1. It holds that
ksA > k
n
A
kshA > k
nh
A , k
sl
A > k
nl
A
ksA >
kshA + k
sl
A
2
, knA >
knhA + k
nl
A
2
and analogously for region B.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from Lemma 1.
We thus observe that central leverage ratios are set higher than local ones; the
same holds true for the corresponding risk sensitive capital requirements. These results
are driven by the spillover effects that are internalized by the central regulator, and
reinforced by its potentially more limited focus on the opportunity cost of capital.
Leverage ratios are higher than expected risk sensitive capital requirements at both
local and central levels, a result driven by the convexity in regulators’ loss functions.
Evaluating the local/central regulators’ loss functions Λn,Λs using the respective
optimal risk sensitive capital and leverage ratios given in Lemma 1, we can then state
5
Proposition 1. The local/central regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios to lever-
age ratios if their costs of discovering bank type mn,ms are below the respective thresholds
m′i =
(q − 1)2κ2ω2i
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0 , i = n, s
and the reverse holds otherwise. The relative benefits of risk sensitive capital ratios are
increasing in regulators’ respective weights on the opportunity cost of capital ωi and the
difference in insolvency risk between bank types κ.
Proof. The central regulator’s loss differential ∆ssl,sr = Λ
s (ksA, k
s
B)−Λs
(
kshA , k
sl
A , k
sh
B , k
sl
B
)
evaluates to
−2ms + (q − 1)
2κ2ω2s
2p(p2 − κ2)
while local regulators’ loss differentials ∆nnl,nr = Λ
n (knA, k
n
B)−Λn
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
)
eval-
uate to
−mn + (q − 1)
2κ2ω2n
4p(p2 − κ2)
for which the roots m′s,m
′
n are readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆iil,ir
∂ωi
>
0,
∂∆iil,ir
∂κ
> 0 are straightforward.
Regulators’ loss functions are assumed to be convex in payouts to depositors in
the case of bank failure, thus risk sensitive capital ratios improve on leverage ratios
to a larger extent the greater the difference in insolvency risk between bank types.
Discovering bank type is costly for regulators, however, giving rise to thresholds in
the cost of bank type discovery above which the reduction in expected losses from
bank failures associated with risk sensitive capital requirements is insufficient to be
worthwhile. Furthermore, as leverage ratios are higher than expected risk sensitive
capital ratios (see Corollary 1), both local and central regulators value the latter even
more the greater their emphasis on the opportunity cost of capital.
Whether local and/or central regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios or leverage
ratios thus depends on their respective costs of discovering bank type; the different
possible combinations are sketched in Figure 1, and more formally summarized in
Corollary 2. Both local and central regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios if
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Figure 1: Regulators’ preference of risk-sensitive capital vs leverage ratios depending
on cost of discovering bank type
ms < m
′
s or leverage ratios if mn > m
′
n; otherwise, central regulators prefer leverage
ratios while local regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios.
Proof. Follows as m′n > m
′
s holds from Proposition 1.
3 Welfare analysis
We now determine the optimal regulatory and supervisory framework by examining the
welfare implications of setting risk sensitive capital or leverage requirements at either
the local or central level. Assuming that the central regulator’s preferences coincide
with the social planner’s, this can be achieved by evaluating the central regulator’s loss
function Λs using the respective optimal risk sensitive capital and leverage ratios given
in Lemma 1. For this we define ωd ≡ ωn − ωs as regulators’ weight differential on the
opportunity cost of capital, and md ≡ ms−mn as regulators’ (potential) cost differential
of discovering bank type; we further assume ωd < ωs for ease of analysis.
Evaluating firstly the central regulator’s loss function using either optimal central
leverage ratios or optimal local ones, we can state
Lemma 2. Central leverage ratios are preferable to local ones throughout. Their relative
benefit is increasing in the size of the spillover φ and regulators’ weight differential on
the opportunity cost of capital ωd.
Proof. The respective loss differential ∆snl,sl = Λ
s (knA, k
n
B)− Λs (ksA, ksB) evaluates to
(pφ+ (q − 1)ωd)2
2p
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which is positive; the comparative statics
∂∆snl,sl
∂φ
> 0,
∂∆snl,sl
∂ωd
> 0 are then straightforward
to obtain.
The central leverage ratios internalize the effect of spillovers arising from bank fail-
ures in the other region, which are ignored by local regulators in their setting of the
optimal leverage ratio. Additionally, local regulators are prone to be overly concerned
by the opportunity cost of capital due to stronger regulatory capture, leading to capital
requirements that are also too low from a central perspective.
We can similarly evaluate the central regulator’s loss function using either optimal
central risk sensitive capital ratios or optimal local ones, and obtain
Lemma 3. Central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferable to local ones if regulators’
cost differential of discovering bank type md is below the threshold
m′d =
1
4
(
(q − 1)2φωd + p
(
φ2 +
(q − 1)2ωd2
p2 − κ2
))
> 0
and the reverse holds otherwise. The central risk sensitive capital ratios’ relative benefit
is increasing in the size of the spillover φ, regulators’ weight differential on the op-
portunity cost of capital ωd and the difference in insolvency risk between bank types κ.
Proof. The respective loss differential ∆snr,sr = Λ
s
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
)−Λs (kshA , kslA , kshB , kslB)
evaluates to
1
2
(
−4md + (q − 1)2φωd + p(φ2 + (q − 1)
2ωd
2
p2 − κ2 )
)
for which the root m′d is readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆snr,sr
∂φ
> 0,
∂∆snr,sr
∂ωd
>
0,
∂∆snr,sr
∂κ
> 0 are straightforward.
As with leverage ratios, the central regulator internalizes the effect of interregion
spillovers in its setting of optimal risk sensitive capital ratios, which are not taken into
account by local regulators. Similarly, as local regulators overemphasize the opportu-
nity cost of capital, they set risk sensitive capital requirements that are even further
below what the central regulator would consider appropriate. These two benefits have,
however, to be weighed against the potentially greater cost faced by the central regu-
lator in determining bank type, due to the increased supervisory “remoteness” it faces.
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This gives thus rise to a threshold in how large regulators’ cost differential of discovering
bank type can be before it negates the benefits brought by central risk sensitive capital
ratios in terms of internalization of spillovers and reduced exposure to regulatory cap-
ture. A natural consequence, relevant from an institutional design perspective, is then
suggested by the following
Corollary 3. Central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferable to local ones throughout
when central regulation is combined with supervision at the local level.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3 for md = 0 as m
′
d > 0.
It is lastly interesting to evaluate the central regulator’s loss function using either
optimal central leverage ratios or optimal local risk sensitive capital ratios; we obtain
Lemma 4. Central leverage ratios are preferable to local risk sensitive capital ratios if
local regulators’ cost of discovering bank type mn is above the threshold
m′′n =
1
4
(
(q − 1)2(κ2ω2s − p2ωd2)
p(p2 − κ2) − φ (pφ+ 2ωd(q − 1))
)
whereas the reverse holds otherwise. The central leverage ratio’s relative benefit is in-
creasing in the size of the spillover φ and regulators’ weight differential on the opportu-
nity cost of capital ωd, but decreasing in the difference in insolvency risk between bank
types κ.
Proof. The respective loss differential ∆snr,sl = Λ
s
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
) − Λs (ksA, ksB) eval-
uates to
2mn + φ(
1
2
pφ+ ωd(q − 1)) + (q − 1)
2(p2ωd
2 − κ2ω2s)
2p(p2 − κ2)
for which the root m′′n is readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆snr,sl
∂φ
> 0,
∂∆snr,sl
∂ωd
>
0,
∂∆snr,sl
∂κ
< 0 are reasonably straightforward.
When local regulators’ cost of discovering bank type is larger than a given threshold,
the potential advantage of risk sensitive capital ratios over leverage ratios, which stems
from the convexity of regulators’ loss functions, is outweighed by the fact that the central
regulator internalizes the effect of interregion spillovers in the setting of optimal capital
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ratios, and also may be less exposed to regulatory capture than local regulators. On
the other hand, local risk sensitive capital ratios can dominate central leverage ratios
when spillover effects, the degree of regulatory capture and the local regulators’ cost of
discovering bank type are sufficiently small or the difference in insolvency risk between
bank types is relatively large.
We can now draw on the relative results obtained so far to characterize the conditions
under which risk sensitive capital or leverage requirements determined at either the local
or central level are best overall from the viewpoint of the central regulator, and thus,
given our assumptions, the social planner. We obtain
Proposition 2. When either local or central regulators are also in charge of supervision,
the best type of capital requirement from an overall welfare perspective is given as follows:
• When the local regulator’s cost of discovering bank type mn is above the threshold
m′′n given in Lemma 4, central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferable overall if
the central regulator’s cost of discovering bank type ms is below the threshold m
′
s
given in Proposition 1, whereas central leverage ratios are most preferred other-
wise.
• When the local regulator’s cost of discovering bank type mn is below the threshold
m′′n given in Lemma 4, central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferable overall if
regulators’ cost differential of discovering bank type md is below the threshold m
′
d
given in Lemma 3, whereas local risk sensitive capital ratios are most preferred
otherwise.
Proof. It holds that m′s − m′′n = 14
(
p
(
(q−1)2ω2d
p2−κ2 + φ
2
)
+ 2(q − 1)φωd
)
> 0 (see Figure
2). Part 1 follows from Proposition 1 and Lemmas 2 and 4, resulting in the preference
ordering SR  SL  NR  NL or SR  SL  NL  NR, and SL  NR 
NL , SL  SR or SL  NL  NR , SL  SR, respectively. Part 2 follows from
Lemmas 2, 3 and 4, resulting in the preference ordering SR  NR  SL  NL and
NR  SL  NL , NR  SR, respectively.
Corollary 4. The relative benefits of central vs. local regulation are greater the larger
the spillover φ and regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity cost of capital ωd.
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They are also greater the larger the difference in insolvency risk between bank types κ
when mn < m
′′
s , inversely related to it when m
′′
s < mn < m
′
n, but unaffected by it when
mn > m
′
n.
Proof. This follows from the comparative statics in Lemmas 2, 3 and 4.
Clearly, regulators’ (relative) costs of discovering bank type are key in determin-
ing whether capital requirements set by local or central regulators are preferable, and
whether these should be in the form of risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios. Capital
requirements set by local regulators are best, in the form of risk sensitive capital ratios,
only if their cost of discovering bank type is sufficiently small in a scenario where local
and central regulators’ cost differential of discovering bank type is sufficiently large. In
all other scenarios, letting central regulators determine capital requirements emerges as
best, generally in the form of risk sensitive capital requirements, but for the case where
the central regulator’s cost of discovering bank type is sufficiently large to warrant im-
plementation of a central leverage ratio instead. A natural consequence of these results,
with particular relevance from an institutional design perspective, is then suggested by
the following
Corollary 5. Central regulation combined with supervision at the local level welfare
dominates the regulatory framework where either local or central regulators are also in
charge of supervision. In this case, central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferable
overall if mn is below the threshold m
′
s given in Proposition 1, whereas central leverage
ratios are most preferred otherwise.
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 2 for md = 0, noting that ∂Λ
s/∂md >
0.
Our results are thus strongly supportive of the important role a central regulator can
play particularly when interregion spillovers are large and local regulators are exposed to
substantial degrees of regulatory capture. However, it also highlights the importance for
such a central regulator to address potential issues relating to supervisory “remoteness”
in this context, e.g. by delegating certain supervisory tasks to local supervisors that
may be able to carry these out more cost-efficiently.
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Figure 2: Regulators’ preference of risk-sensitive capital vs leverage ratios and further
cost threshold of discovering bank type
4 Extensions
4.1 Shifting from local to central regulation
We now go one step further by examining whether local regulators might ever agree to
surrender regulatory power to a central regulator, or whether such a transition would
have to be imposed on them. Given the welfare results obtained in the previous section,
we will frame this as a potential regulatory regime shift where a local regulator considers
whether or not to cede regulatory powers to a central authority, while retaining its
supervisory role in the case of regulation at the central level (i.e. ms = mn as a result).
Evaluating now local regulators’ loss function using either optimal central leverage
ratios or optimal local ones, analogously to above, we can then state
Lemma 5. Local regulators perceive central leverage ratios as preferable to local ones if
the spillover φ is above the threshold
φ′ =
(q − 1)ωd
p
> 0
whereas the reverse holds otherwise. The central leverage ratios’ relative benefit is de-
creasing in regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity cost of capital ωd.
Proof. The respective loss differential ∆nnl,sl = Λ
n (knA, k
n
B)− Λn (ksA, ksB) evaluates to
1
4
p
(
φ2 − (q − 1)
2ωd
2
p2
)
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for which the (positive) root φ′ is readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆nnl,sl
∂ωd
< 0
are straightforward.
We can similarly evaluate local regulators’ loss function using either optimal central
risk sensitive capital ratios or optimal local ones, and obtain
Lemma 6. Local regulators perceive central risk sensitive capital ratios as preferable to
local ones if the spillover φ is above the threshold
φ′′ =
2(q − 1)ωd
2
√
p2 − κ2 > 0
whereas the reverse holds otherwise. The central risk sensitive capital ratios’ relative
benefit is decreasing in regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity cost of capital
ωd and the difference in insolvency risk between bank types κ.
Proof. The respective loss differential ∆nnr,sr = Λ
n
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
)−Λn (kshA , kslA , kshB , kslB)
evaluates to
1
4
p
(
φ2 − (q − 1)
2ωd
2
p2 − κ2
)
for which the (positive) root φ′′ is readily obtained; the comparative statics ∂∆
n
nr,sr
∂ωd
<
0,
∂∆nnr,sr
∂κ
< 0 are straightforward.
As local regulators ignore positive spillover effects of higher capital ratios on the
other region, central risk sensitive capital ratios or leverage ratios can nevertheless be
perceived as preferable by local regulators as long as those spillover effects are substantial
enough. This effect becomes weaker, however, the greater the weight differential on the
opportunity cost of capital between local and central regulators: the higher capital
ratios imposed by the central regulator are then perceived as being too costly by local
regulators as they are facing greater regulatory capture.
Lastly, it is similarly helpful to evaluate local regulators’ loss function using either
optimal central leverage ratios or optimal local risk sensitive capital ratios; we obtain
Lemma 7. Local regulators perceive central leverage ratios as preferable to local risk
13
sensitive capital ratios if the spillover φ is above the threshold
φ′′′ =
√
(q − 1)2(p2ωd2 + κ2ωs(2ωd + ωs))
p2(p2 − κ2) −
4mn
p
> 0 for mn ≤ m′n
whereas the reverse holds otherwise. The central leverage ratio’s relative benefit is in-
creasing in the local regulator’s cost of discovering bank type mn, but decreasing in
regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity cost of capital ωd and the difference in
insolvency risk between bank types κ.
Proof. The respective loss differential ∆nnr,sl = Λ
n
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
)− Λn (ksA, ksB) eval-
uates to
mn +
p
4
φ2 − (q − 1)
2(p2ωd
2 + κ2ωs(2ωd + ωs))
4p(p2 − κ2)
This is positive for mn ≥ m′′′n = (q−1)
2(p2ωd
2+κ2ωs(2ωd+ωs))
4p(p2−κ2) ; as m
′′′
n > m
′
n, however, local
regulators actually prefer leverage to risk sensitive capital ratios in that region (from
Corollary 2). The (positive) root φ′′′ is readily obtained otherwise; the comparative
statics
∂∆nnr,sl
∂mn
> 0,
∂∆nnr,sl
∂ωd
< 0,
∂∆nnr,sl
∂κ
< 0 are straightforward.
We observe that, even from local regulators’ perspective, as long as their cost of
discovering bank type is larger than a given threshold, the potential advantage of risk
sensitive capital ratios over leverage ratios is outweighed by the fact that the central
regulator internalizes the effect of interregion spillovers in the setting of optimal capital
ratios. This effect obviously becomes stronger the more substantial those spillover
effects; it matters less, however, the greater the weight differential on the opportunity
cost of capital between local/central regulators and the more sizeable the difference in
insolvency risk between bank types.
We can now draw on the relative results obtained in this section to characterize the
conditions under which risk sensitive capital or leverage requirements determined at the
central level are also perceived as preferable from the viewpoint of local regulators. We
obtain
Proposition 3. Local regulators prefer to cede regulatory powers to a central authority,
retaining their supervisory role in the case of regulation at the central level, if
14
• the spillover φ is above the threshold φ′′ when the local supervisor’s cost of discov-
ering bank type mn is below the threshold m
′
s
• the spillover φ is above the threshold φ′ when the local supervisor’s cost of discov-
ering bank type mn is above the threshold m
′
n
• the spillover φ is above the threshold φ′′′ when the local supervisor’s cost of discov-
ering bank type mn lies between the thresholds m
′
s and m
′
n
whereas they would prefer to retain their local regulatory powers otherwise.
Proof. It was previously shown that m′s < m
′
n holds (see Figure 1). Then in line with
Corollary 2, Lemma 6 applies if mn < m
′
s, Lemma 5 applies if mn > m
′
n, and Lemma 7
applies if m′s < mn < m
′
n.
Corollary 6. From local regulators’ perspective, the relative benefits of central vs. local
regulation are smaller the larger regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity cost
of capital ωd. They are also (weakly) smaller the larger the difference in insolvency risk
between bank types κ, and (weakly) greater the larger local supervisors’ cost of discovering
bank type mn.
Proof. This follows from the comparative statics in Lemmas 5, 6 and 7.
We thus observe that local regulators may generally be inclined to surrender regula-
tory power to a central regulator as long as the spillover effects at play are substantial
enough. However, this effect needs to be strong enough to outweigh the perceived dis-
advantage of relatively higher central capital ratios, stemming from local supervisors
greater concern about the cost of capital faced by banks, in line with their greater ex-
posure to supervisory capture. Which of those two effects then gains the upper hand
in practice is clearly an empirical question, and unfortunately lies largely outside the
influence of central regulators or policymakers more generally.
4.2 Role of systemic risk
Given the recent focus on the importance of systemic as compared to bank-level risk,
it is of interest to revisit our results of Section 3 by examining what approach to bank
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capital regulation is best from an overall welfare perspective when we additionally allow
for the notion of systemic risk.
To approach this question, we remain within a framework where central regulation
is combined with supervision at the local level and rewrite the loss function faced by
the central regulator as
Λs = 2ms +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + ωskiA (q − 1) + (φ+ φs1i=h,j=h)pjB(1− kjB)
+ pjB(1− kjB)2 + ωskjB (q − 1) + (φ+ φs1i=h,j=h)piA(1− kiA)) (7)
where ms = mn, and φs > 0 is the differential spillover effect when both domestic and
foreign bank are of type h; this reflects that foreign bank failures may have greater
domestic impact when the banking sector is exposed to ”systemic risk” in this sense.
The corresponding loss function considered by the local regulator in region A is
ΛnA = mn +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + ωnkiA (q − 1) + (φ+ φs1i=h,j=h)pjB(1− kjB)) (8)
and an analogous loss function applies to the local regulator in region B.
Solving for local/central regulators’ optimal risk sensitive capital and leverage ratios
as in Section 2, and then evaluating the revised loss functions eqs. (7) and (8) with
these, we can state
Proposition 4. When systemic risk materializes through differential spillover effects,
local/central regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios to leverage ratios if the cost of
discovering bank type mn is below the respective thresholds
m′n =
(q − 1)2κ2ω2n
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0 , m
′′
s =
(φs(p
2 − κ2) + 4(q − 1)κωs)2
64p(p2 − κ2) > 0
and the reverse holds otherwise. The relative benefits of risk sensitive capital ratios at
the central level are increasing in the spillover differential φs associated with systemic
risk.
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Proof. The central regulator’s loss differential ∆ssl,sr evaluates to
−2ms + (φs(p
2 − κ2) + 4(q − 1)κωs)2
32p(p2 − κ2)
while local regulator’s loss differential ∆nnl,nr evaluate to
−mn + (q − 1)
2κ2ω2n
4p(p2 − κ2)
for which the roots m′′s ,m
′
n are readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆ssl,sr
∂φs
>
0,
∂∆nnl,nr
∂φs
= 0 are straightforward.
While local regulators’ choice is unaffected by the introduction of the systemic risk
element, the central regulator is shown to value risk sensitive capital ratios more the
greater the impact of systemic risk.4 We can further obtain
Corollary 7. As long as the spillover differential φs associated with systemic risk is
sufficiently small, i.e. φs < φ
′
s =
4(q−1)κ(ωn−ωs)
p2−κ2 , Corollary 2 holds (with ms = mn).
Proof. Follows as m′n −m′′s =
16(q−1)2κ2ωn2−(φs(p2−κ2)+4(q−1)κωs)2
64p(p2−κ2) > 0 when φs < φ
′
s.
It is then straightforward to obtain results, analogous to Proposition 2 and Corollary
4, that allow for the impact of systemic risk as follows
Proposition 5. When central regulation is combined with supervision at the local level
and systemic risk materializes through differential spillover effects, central risk sensi-
tive capital ratios are preferable from an overall welfare perspective if mn is below the
threshold m′′s given in Proposition 4, whereas central leverage ratios are most preferred
otherwise.
Proof. In this case, central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferred to local ones
4This result is driven by the convexity in regulators’ loss functions, as optimal central leverage
ratios exceed expected risk sensitive capital requirements more the larger the spillover differential φs
associated with systemic risk.
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throughout as the respective loss differential ∆snr,sr evaluates to
1
16
(
(4φ+ φs) (φsκ+ 4ωd(q − 1)) + p
(
8φ2 + 4φφs + φ
2
s +
8(q − 1)2ω2d
(p2 − κ2)
))
> 0
Also, central leverage ratios are always preferred to local ones as the respective loss
differential ∆snl,sl evaluates to
(p(4φ+ φs) + φsκ+ 4(q − 1)ωd)2
32p
> 0
This results in the following preference ordering when mn < m
′′
s : SR  SL  NL and
SR  NR. When mn > m′′s , we have SL  SR  NR and SL  NL.
Corollary 8. When the spillover differential φs associated with systemic risk is not too
large, i.e. φs < φ
′
s, the relative benefits of central vs. local regulation are larger the
greater the degree of systemic risk affecting the economy when mn < m
′′
s or mn > m
′
n,
or as long as pωd > κωs (a sufficient condition) when m
′′
s < mn < m
′
n. The impact
of the degree of systemic risk on the relative benefits of central vs. local regulation is
greater the larger the spillover φ and regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity
cost of capital ωd; it is also greater the larger the difference in insolvency risk between
bank types κ when mn < m
′′
s or mn > m
′
n, but indeterminate when m
′′
s < mn < m
′
n .
Proof. In line with Corollary 7, the relevant comparative static results on the relative
benefits of central vs. local regulation with respect to the degree of systemic risk φs in
this case are
∂∆snr,sr
∂φs
=
1
8
((2φ+ φs)(p+ κ) + 2(q − 1)ωd) > 0
∂∆snl,sl
∂φs
=
(p+ κ) (p(4φ+ φs) + φsκ+ 4(q − 1)ωd)
16p
> 0
and
∂∆snr,sl
∂φs
=
p2(4φ+ φs) + 2pκ(2φ+ φs) + φsκ
2 + 4 (q − 1) (pωd − κωs)
16p
for which a sufficient condition to be positive clearly is pωd > κωs. The respective
second-order partial derivatives ∂
2∆s
∂φs∂φ
> 0, ∂
2∆s
∂φs∂ωd
> 0 and
∂2∆snr,sr
∂φs∂κ
> 0,
∂2∆snl,sl
∂φs∂κ
>
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0,
∂2∆snr,sl
∂φs∂κ
≷ 0 are then straightforward to obtain.
Our results thus reiterate that systemic risk matters for the optimal design of a
regulatory framework, and in particular that bank capital regulation would generally
be more beneficial at the central than at the local level the greater the impact of systemic
risk in the economy, Allowing for systemic risk properly in this context matters even
more the larger the spillover effects between regions, and the greater the extent to which
local regulators are subject to regulatory capture.
4.3 Asymmetry in regulatory capture at local level
Given our focus throughout on the importance of differences in regulatory capture
between local and central supervisors, it is of further interest to examine what approach
to bank capital regulation is best from an overall welfare perspective when there is
asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level.
To address this issue, we remain once again within a framework where central reg-
ulation is combined with supervision at the local level. The loss function faced by the
central regulator is then simply eq. (1) where ms = mn; the loss functions considered
by the local regulators in regions A,B, on the other hand, are rewritten as
ΛnA = mn +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + (ωn − ωa) kiA (q − 1) + φpjB(1− kjB)) (9)
ΛnB = mn +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piB(1− kiB)2 + (ωn + ωa) kiB (q − 1) + φpjA(1− kjA)) (10)
where ωa > 0 captures the degree of asymmetry in local regulators’ respective weights
on the opportunity cost of capital, to be interpreted here as asymmetry in regulatory
capture at the local level, with ωa < ωd.
5
Again, we solve for local/central regulators’ optimal risk sensitive capital and lever-
age ratios as in Section 2; evaluating the revised loss functions eqs. (9) and (10) with
these, we can then state
5Without loss of generality, we assume that the local regulator in region A attaches a lower weight
to the opportunity cost of capital than the one in region B, i.e. ωs < ω
A
n < ω
B
n .
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Proposition 6. When there is asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level, local
regulators in regions A,B and the central regulator prefer risk sensitive capital ratios to
leverage ratios if the cost of discovering bank type mn is below the respective thresholds
m′nA =
(q − 1)2κ2 (ωn − ωa)2
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0 , m
′
nB =
(q − 1)2κ2 (ωn + ωa)2
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0
m′s =
(q − 1)2κ2ω2s
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0
and the reverse holds otherwise.
Proof. This follows analogously to Proposition 1.
While the central regulator’s choice is obviously unaffected by this, the local regula-
tor in region B values risk sensitive capital ratios more than their counterpart in region
A the larger the degree of asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level. We can
further obtain a, now more complex, equivalent of Corollary 2 as
Corollary 9. Both local and central regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios if
mn < m
′
s or leverage ratios if mn > m
′
nB; the central regulator prefers leverage ratios
while both local regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios if m′s < mn < m
′
nA; the
central regulator and the local regulator in region A prefer leverage ratios while the local
regulator in region B prefers risk sensitive capital ratios if m′nA < mn < m
′
nB.
Proof. Follows as m′nB > m
′
nA > m
′
s hold from Proposition 6.
It is then straightforward to obtain results, analogous to Proposition 2 and Corollary
4, that allow for the impact of asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level as
follows
Proposition 7. When central regulation is combined with supervision at the local level
and there is asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level, central risk sensitive cap-
ital ratios are preferable from an overall welfare perspective if mn is below the threshold
m′s given in Proposition 6, whereas central leverage ratios are most preferred otherwise.
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Proof. In this case, central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferred to local ones
throughout as the respective loss differential ∆snr,sr evaluates to
1
2
(
2(q − 1)φωd + p(φ2 + (q − 1)
2 (ω2d + ω
2
a)
p2 − κ2 )
)
> 0
Also, central leverage ratios are always preferred to local ones as the respective loss
differential ∆snl,sl evaluates to
(pφ+ (q − 1)ωd)2 + (q − 1)2ω2a
2p
> 0
Finally, central leverage ratios are preferred to local leverage ratios in region A combined
with local risk sensitive capital ratios in region B if the respective loss differential
∆snlArB ,sl , which evaluates to
2p (p2 − κ2) (4mn + pφ2 + 2(q − 1)φωd)
4p (p2 − κ2) +
(q − 1)2 (2p2 (ω2d + ω2a)− κ2 ((ωd − ωa)2 + ω2s))
4p (p2 − κ2)
is positive; this is satisfied if
mn > m
′′′
n =
(q − 1)2κ2 ((ωd − ωa)2 + ω2s)
8p (p2 − κ2) −
2p ((p2 − κ2) (pφ2 + 2(q − 1)φωd) + p(q − 1)2 (ω2d + ω2a))
8p (p2 − κ2)
which holds in the region (see Figure 3) where mn > m
′
s as
m′s −m′′′n =
(q − 1)2 (2p2 (ω2d + ω2a) + κ2 (ω2s − (ωd − ωa)2))
8p (p2 − κ2) +
2pφ (p2 − κ2) (pφ+ 2(q − 1)ωd)
8p (p2 − κ2) > 0
with ωa < ωd < ωs by assumption.
This results in the following preference ordering when mn < m
′
s : SR  SL  NL
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and SR  NR. When mn > m′s, we have SL  SR  NR, SL  NL and SL 
NLARB.
Corollary 10. The relative benefits of central vs. local regulation are larger the greater
the degree of asymmetry ωa in regulatory capture at the local level. The impact of the
degree of asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level on the relative benefits of
central vs. local regulation is lower the higher is average bank insolvency risk p; it is
(weakly) greater the larger the difference in insolvency risk between bank types κ and local
and central regulators’ (average) weight differential on the opportunity cost of capital ωd.
Proof. In line with Corollary 9, the relevant comparative static results on the relative
benefits of central vs. local regulation with respect to the degree of asymmetry ωa in
local regulators’ respective weights on the opportunity cost of capital in this case are
∂∆snr,sr
∂ωa
=
∂∆snr,sl
∂ωa
=
p(q − 1)2ωa
p2 − κ2 > 0
∂∆snl,sl
∂ωa
=
(q − 1)2ωa
p
> 0
∂∆snlArB ,sl
∂ωa
=
(q − 1)2 (ωa (2p2 − κ2) + κ2ωd)
2p (p2 − κ2) > 0
The respective second-order partial derivatives ∂
2∆s
∂φs∂p
< 0, ∂
2∆s
∂φs∂κ
≥ 0, ∂2∆s
∂φs∂ωd
≥ 0 are then
reasonably straightforward to obtain.
Our results thus highlight that bank capital regulation would generally be more
beneficial at the central than at the local level the greater the degree of asymmetry in
regulatory capture at the local level. Differences in the degree of regulatory capture
at the local level favor central regulation more the lower is (average) bank insolvency
risk, but the larger the difference in insolvency risk between different bank types and
the greater the difference in (average) regulatory capture between local and central
regulators.
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Figure 3: Regulators’ preference of risk-sensitive capital vs leverage ratios and alterna-
tive cost thresholds of discovering bank type
5 Conclusion
We developed a simple two-region model where local regulators are concerned about
expected costs of their banks failing and the opportunity cost of capital, but ignore
interregion spillovers associated with bank failures. A central regulator internalizes the
positive spillover effects of higher capital ratios, but faces a potentially higher cost of
observing bank types than local regulators due to its supervisory “remoteness”; it may
furthermore attach less weight to banks’ opportunity cost of capital if exposed to less
regulatory capture than local regulators. Our results demonstrated the importance of
capital requirements being determined at a central level particularly when interregion
spillovers are large and local regulators suffer from substantial degrees of regulatory
capture. We stressed the importance for such a central regulator to address the poten-
tial issues relating to supervisory “remoteness” in this context, and showed that local
regulators may be inclined to surrender regulatory power to a central regulator only
when spillover effects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small.
We also showed that bank capital regulation at the central rather than the local level
is more beneficial the larger the impact of systemic risk and the greater the degree of
asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level. Our results are relevant for the opti-
mal design of ”vertical” regulatory architecture in any economy that has multiple bank
regulators and/or supervisors at possibly different levels, and may thus be of interest to
policymakers regarding the proposed ”Single Supervisory Mechanism” in Europe, the
dual supervisory system existing in US banking, or other analogous regional financial
and regulatory arrangements across the globe.
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